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30 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

FROM : W. A. Tidwell

SUBJECT : Idea for the OCB

1. U. S. political activity abroad in recent years has been characterized by two major themes. These themes might be stated in various ways, but one way of describing them is as follows:

a. We have tried to create in the free world a military posture that would prevent the overthrow of free governments by Communist revolution and discourage direct military conquest by the Soviet Union and its associates.

b. We have tried to convince people in the free world and in the Soviet Bloc alike, that the American way of life is a comfortable and desirable way of life and that this way of life is more comfortable and more desirable than the way in which people outside the United States now live.

2. These two major courses of action might be subjected to the following criticisms:

a. We have been reasonably successful in the lower levels of military activity (arms for Thailand, Saudi Arabia, etc.) but we have neglected to some degree the central part of the problem. We have not made damned certain that our most advanced weapons are better and more numerous than those of the Soviet Union, and since this is the central pillar of the military problem, we run the risk of having our entire military program stumble over this neglect. At the same time that we have failed to ensure success in the main problem we have given so much publicity to our actions in the lesser military problems that we have sounded a bit like sabre rattlers. On the other hand the Soviet Union has talked peace, disarmament and competitive coexistence but has made tremendous strides in the development and production of advanced military hardware. This has given them both a military and a political advantage.

b. In our campaign to win friends we have been even more off the track. We have worked hard and spent millions of dollars to convince people of something that they already believe; namely, that the U. S. has a fantastically high standard of living and enjoys the material

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fruits of modern industry. Not only is this belief widely held throughout the world, inside and outside the Soviet Bloc, but it is also the very reason that the Communists have made gains in influencing people in under-developed areas. According to Communist theory, the U. S. is an imperialist power and imperialist powers want to prevent under-developed countries from becoming industrialized and enjoying the fruits of this industrialization. Also Communist theory says that Communism is the way by which under-developed countries can become industrialized, and the achievements of Soviet science and industry are used to drive home this argument. In other words, the U. S. propaganda campaign has tended to sharpen the desires of people throughout the world for something that the Communists say that they can get for them best.

3. Although the U. S. has been exceedingly generous in its foreign aid program during the past decade, this program has lacked a central theme—a goal that was desired and appreciated by the people of the world. Only during the Marshall Plan did we have this goal, and the formulation and focusing of world attention on this goal was probably as important as the actual economic results. Since that time much of our Foreign Aid has appeared to be hap-hazard, changing in focus, and often taking on the appearance of state bribes a la Roma Imperia. This method of extending foreign aid is more likely to generate friction and dissatisfaction than it is to encourage unity of purpose and sympathetic working toward a common goal (in opposition to Communism).

4. Thus, although we have actually done a great deal to improve the economic situation in under-developed or hard pressed nations, our achievements in this field are not widely recognized because since the days of the Marshall Plan we have not had a central, readily understandable, and dramatic goal toward which our efforts and the efforts of those we are aiding could be directed. The lack of this goal and common purpose has left the field clear to the Communists who have provided the goal (Industrialization like the Soviet Union) and who take advantage of the sharpened desires and friction that we have encouraged to influence people against us. If it were a Judo match the Communists would be using our great efforts to send us flying into a corner.

5. There are several things that we could do in this situation to set a clear course and to get maximum return from the resources that we are putting into the struggle with the Soviet Union. These are:

a. Organize a large scale and effective program of scientific research, aimed far ahead of immediate horizons, which would at the same time generate by-product developments of great importance to weaponry in the immediate future.

b. Take the initiative in a public search for peace and measures to avoid war, while continuing to shore up the military strength of our allies.

c. Announce to the world an economic goal for the world and a plan to achieve that goal, showing that democratic industry can conceive more brilliantly and execute more efficiently than can communist industry.

6. It should be a fairly simple matter to estimate the GNP of the Free World, outside the U. S., and to announce as our goal a doubling of this GNP in twenty years (or some similar period). Or we could put it in more understandable terms by saying that we intend to see that everybody has the opportunity to double their standard of living in twenty years. We could embellish it by saying that we intended to help the world cut the death rate in half in ten years, or some such period. Once we had formulated and announced the goal we could offer any nation the opportunity to associate itself with us in developing concrete economic plans for the achievement of the goal. Once the plans were drawn up we could negotiate the resources that we and other nations might contribute toward the fulfillment of the plan for a particular country. This would then permit us to focus our propaganda on "what the U. S. is doing to improve the welfare of country X" instead of "look what we have that you don't have."

7. There is no reason to think that a program such as that mentioned above should be prohibitively expensive. We have a certain amount of natural economic growth in the world that will go part way toward meeting the goal anyway. Next, we are already spending a large amount of money which, if focused on the right things, would give further help toward the goal. Last, we can contribute a great deal more in the way of trained brains, planning skill, engineering talent, and other trained technicians than we are doing currently. This type of help can do a great deal to make native resources more effective, and it is a great deal cheaper than some of the other forms of aid that we have used in the past. The Soviet Union has used this technique in China with tremendous effectiveness, and there is no reason why we shouldn't use it too.